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1 Introduction 
 
There is by now a significant volume of literature on the influence of the sponsoring company 
on funding and portfolio allocation decisions of its defined benefit pension fund. This 
literature is almost entirely theoretical. Depending on which angle is adopted, theory predicts 
whether or not it is beneficial to the sponsoring company when pension plans invest more in 
risky assets, or whether or not a sponsoring company has an incentive to underfund the 
pension fund by lowering its contributions to the fund.  
 
Relative to the number of theoretical studies, empirical evidence on this particular subject is 
sparse, probably due to lack of data. One recent empirical contribution is Cocco and Volpin 
(2007) who assess whether the inclusion of insider-trustees (i.e. trustees that are also 
executive directors of the sponsoring company) in the board of UK defined benefit pension 
funds affects the share of equities in the fund’s portfolio and the magnitude of the sponsor’s 
contributions. They use cross section data on 90 UK pension funds for a single year, 2002.  
 
We contribute to the empirical evidence on the relationship between pension finance and 
sponsoring using a rich set of data on Dutch company pension funds. To our knowledge, this 
is the first paper to test theoretical predictions in this area in a comprehensive manner. The 
main characteristics of Dutch funds are: dominance of defined benefit pension schemes, 
absence of any pension benefit insurance, absence of restrictive regulation concerning 
sponsoring companies’ contributions, and a 50/50 representation of the pension fund’s board 
by employer and employee. These characteristics make the Dutch system particularly 
interesting for the research problem at hand, as option theory is particularly relevant for 
defined benefit schemes, there is no benefit insurance with its concomitant moral hazard 
problems, and agency problems are imminent when employers are represented in the fund’s 
board. The dataset is relatively rich, as it covers 500 to 600 company pension funds over a ten 
year period, 1996-2005. Hence, the difficult years 2000-2002, of low stock market sentiment 
and low interest rates, are included in the sample. Moreover, we use supervisory data on 
required technical provisions of individual pension funds, which allows a more accurate 
identification of underfunding or overfunding. Complementary to the data on company 
pension funds, we collected data for 100 sponsoring firms, half of which were listed on the 
stock exchange. 
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Our study is structured as follows. First we outline the institutional setting, including features 
of the Dutch pension system, regulatory aspects and recent trends in fund coverage. Then we 
give a brief sketch of the existing theoretical literature on the relationship between pension 
finance and sponsoring firms. Next, we outline the methodology and data used and present 
our empirical results for the capital structure, sponsor contributions, and portfolio allocation, 
respectively. 
 
 
2 The institutional setting 
 
In this section we describe the institutional setting during the period under investigation. We 
briefly sketch the Dutch pension system, regulation, and recent trends in pension funding. 
 
2.1 The Dutch pension system 
  
The Dutch pension system is remarkable for its high dependence on fully funded, defined 
benefit occupational pensions. The value of pension fund assets is well over 100% of GDP. 
The Dutch pension system has two main tiers, consisting of a flat rate public scheme and 
earnings-related, funded private schemes, mostly organised in pension funds. Most companies 
offer a pension scheme to their employees, either organized in a company pension fund or 
participating in an industry-wide pension fund.1 If a pension scheme is offered, participation 
is mandatory for the employee, so that the system could be described as ‘quasi-mandatory’. 
The result is a coverage ratio of 91% for all workers.  
 
As a result of this high coverage, the Dutch pension fund industry is well developed. In 2005 
Dutch pension funds’ total assets were worth $ 780 billion, which accounts for more than half 
of all Euro area pension assets (OECD, 2006). In relative terms to its economy, the 
Netherlands has the worlds’ largest pension fund industry (figure 1).  
 
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
 
The Dutch pension fund industry includes more than 800 pension funds, of which some 700 
are company pension funds (the subject of this study) and about 100 are industry-wide funds. 
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Defined benefit schemes are still dominant in the Netherlands: 9 out of 10 workers have one. 
In recent years, many pension funds switched from final earnings-based to career average-
based pension schemes. The typical Dutch pension scheme presently aims at building up a 
pension entitlement within 40 years, yielding a benefit ranging from 70 to 80 percent of the 
career average-wage (including the first pillar flat rate benefit). Most career average-based 
schemes apply wage inflation indexation, conditional on the fund’s financial health.  
 
2.2 Regulation  
 
Each Dutch company pension fund has to be organised in a legal entity, which is separate and 
independent from the sponsoring companies. Most pension funds are organised in 
foundations. One half of the foundation’s board is appointed by the employer, the other half 
by the employees. Nevertheless the board members are required to act independently and only 
in the fund’s interest. In principle, a pension fund must be able to continue functioning for the 
benefit of all existing participants even if the sponsoring company ceases to exist.  
 
In the Netherlands, there is no public pension benefit insurance of any sort, like there is in the 
US. The supervisory authority gives directions to individual funds concerning the minimum 
capital requirements and investment policy. The most important of these directions during the 
period under investigation were the following2:  
(1) Liabilities of the fund (accumulated benefit obligations) are valued by a fixed discount 
rate with a maximum of 4%. 
(2) Assets are valued in market prices, although in the earlier years of our sample period 
pension funds were also allowed to value bonds by their redemption value. 
(3) Basically, there are no investment restrictions, only a directive that investments have to be 
‘solid’. This precludes, for instance, large financial interests of the pension fund in the 
sponsoring company.    
(4) The value of assets has to be greater than that of the required technical reserve. Hence, 
there are no formal restrictions to premium holidays or even refunds of employer 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
1
 If there is an industry-wide pension scheme, employers are obliged to participate. 
2
 Our data sample period covers 1996-2005, and hence falls before the year 2007 in which a new, risk based 
regulatory regime came into force. 
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contributions as long as the pension fund is in a healthy financial position. Furthermore, there 
is no additional reserve requirement for risky assets.3  
 
2.3 Recent trends in pension fund coverage 
 
Figure 2 shows the cover ratio of the median Dutch company pension fund. The cover ratio is 
defined as assets available to cover the technical provisions as a percentage of the required 
technical provision (excluding reinsurance). The availability of supervisory data on the 
required technical provisions of individual pension funds makes the Dutch dataset that we use 
unique, in that it allows identification of underfunded funds.  
 
The cover ratio of our sample of Dutch funds deteriorated in 2000-2002 and recovered 
partially in the following years 2003-2005, the last years in our sample. The drop in the cover 
ratio reflected the fall in fund profitability, which was especially related to negative 
investment yields on equity. The crash in the stock market manifested itself globally and the 
development of the cover ratio of Dutch pension funds is representative of other countries’ 
defined benefit pension fund sectors as well.4 
 
 [Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
Figure 3 shows the percentile distribution of the cover ratio in our sample. If we take a cover 
ratio of 100% as the minimum level, then no more than ten percent of the pension funds was 
underfunded and then in one single year only, 2002. Although the supervision framework 
considers nominal obligations – the indexation promises are not ‘hard’ promises in a legal 
sense – a cut-off point of 130% for the cover ratio is more appropriate as a measure of 
underfunding. This benchmark also reflects the Dutch pension funds’ common practice to 
provide for a pension benefit in real terms. With an annual inflation rate of 2 percent (the 
inflation target of the ECB) a nominal cover ratio of approximately 130% would translate into 
a real cover ratio of 100%. Hence, in the empirical part we will consider a cover ratio below 
                                                             
3
 This changed in September 2002, when the supervisor strengthened the coverage requirements. Since then a 
minimum coverage of 105% was required. Furthermore an additional reserve for investment risk had to be 
formed. Basically these reserves had to be sufficiently great to ensure solvency in the case of a 40% equity price 
decline and a 10% bond price decline.       
4
 See for example Davis (2004) on UK developments which parallel those in the Netherlands. 
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130% as a state of underfunding (the red horizontal line).5 With a bench mark ratio of 130%, 
more than three quarters of all funds (the light blue line) went into a state of underfunding in 
the crisis year 2002, when the stock market collapsed. One half of all funds (the yellow line) 
of the sample went into underfunding already in 2001.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
The drop in the cover ratio differed widely between funds. Figure 4 shows the frequency 
distribution of the change in the cover ratio between 1999 and 2002. Most funds’ cover ratios 
fell by 10 to 50 percentage points. However, some funds saw their cover ratio fall by more 
than 50 percentage points, while a few saw their cover ratios increase. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
3 Theory and hypotheses  
 
 
Pension funds provide means for individuals to accumulate saving over their working life so 
as to finance their consumption needs in retirement. The key feature of a defined benefit 
pension fund, which is the dominant type of fund in the Netherlands, is that the pension plan 
contains embedded options. Treynor (1977) was one of the first to describe that a company 
sponsoring a defined benefit pension plan owns a put option. If the assets of the company and 
the fund fall short of the pension fund liabilities, the sponsoring company has a put option to 
give these assets to the pension beneficiaries as payment and liquidate the pension fund. Since 
the value of each option increases with the risk of the underlying assets, the sponsoring 
company may have an incentive to increase the risk of the assets (of the company and the 
fund) beyond what is optimal for the pension plan participants. This could explain why 
“employer corporations urge pension fund managers to invest pension funds in risky assets” 
(Treynor, 1977, p. 632).  
 
Although pension funds are legally separated from the sponsoring firm in the Netherlands (see 
Section 2.2) - as they should be according to OECD principles and EU directives - in reality 
there is no watershed between the sponsor and its pension fund. Particularly in the case of 
                                                             
5
 Different hurdle ratios would not alter the qualitative conclusions of the empirical analysis, only their statistical 
significance. 
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funded defined benefit schemes, the dominant form in the Netherlands, recurrent occasions of 
overfunding and underfunding may lead to additional cash flows between the two parties. In 
case of a pension funding deficit, the sponsor may have the legal or moral obligation to 
increase contributions. In this respect, Kocken (2006) points out that defined benefit pension 
plans involve three embedded options including the one described by Treynor (1977).6 First, 
defined benefit pension plans often involve employer guarantees to make additional payments 
in case the fund’s cover ratio drops below some pre-specified level. This guarantee option is 
written by the employer and can be exercised by the pension plan participants if the cover 
ratio drops below the minimum. Second, there is an offsetting option for the employer to 
default on its pension payment promises, written by the plan participants (this is Treynor’s 
option). Third, the employer can often exercise a conditional indexation option, by not 
granting inflation indexation. Usually, the employer will exercise the conditional indexation 
option before the pension plan exercises the employer guarantee option. Naturally, the option 
to default can not be exercised before the employer guarantee is. The exercise of all three 
types of options is triggered by various values of the fund’s cover ratio, making the volatility 
of this ratio a key variable to the option values. The volatility of the cover ratio in turn will be 
determined by the fund’s asset mix to a considerable extent. For example, a shift in asset mix 
from bonds to shares, by increasing the cover ratio’s volatility, raises the value of both the 
guarantee option and the default option. Kocken also shows that a lower employer credit 
rating reduces the value of the guarantee option and increases the value of the default option. 
Finally, underfunding is demonstrated to increase the guarantee option.  
 
As a result of the impact on relative option values, a pension fund should reduce risk taking 
for the benefit of its participants, by investing in less risky assets, if the sponsor has a high 
risk profile, which may be proxied by high leverage or low credit rating (Broeders, 2006).   
 
From another perspective, that of optimal contract theory and capital market imperfections, 
Cooper and Ross (2002) argue that company pension funds may be underfunded in 
circumstances when their sponsoring company makes little or no profits, is not able to borrow 
(e.g. due to high leverage), and the investment yield of the pension fund’s portfolio is lower 
than the yield on the financial markets.  
 
                                                             
6
 Our summary of Kocken (2006) draws heavily on Ambachtsheer (2007). 
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From yet another angle, i.e., contracting theory and risk sharing between employers and 
workers, Arnott and Gersovitz (1980) suggest that a risk-averse firm may have underfunded 
pension liabilities as a way to share risk with risk-averse workers. Webb (2007) proxies risk 
averseness by the inverse of a company’s size. Hence, in case of underfunding, when 
corporate bonds are senior to pension claims, a small firm has more incentives to shift risk to 
the pension fund by raising its own leverage. Also Ippolito (1985) sees underfunding as a way 
to improve a firm’s bargaining position with labour unions. 
 
Webb (2007) suggests that pension plan liabilities are similar to long term debt. Accordingly, 
pension plan deficits that must be funded are a debt burden (whereas surpluses and unfunded 
deficits are sources of equity) to the sponsoring firm. The sponsoring company, according to 
Cocco and Volpin (2007) may thus have an incentive to favour shareholders by reducing 
contributions to the fund, thus minimizing funds payable to debt holders. Again, the incentive 
is greater in a highly leveraged firm. Also, they will contribute less to the fund per se, and will 
have a larger dividend payout (Webb, 2007).  
 
The hypotheses that we are going to test empirically concern asset allocation decisions of 
pension funds and capital structure decisions, respectively: 
 
Capital structure: 
i. Pension funds have lower cover ratios/sponsor contributions when their sponsoring 
companies make little or no profits (Cooper and Ross, 2002); 
ii. Pension funds have lower cover ratios/sponsor contributions when their sponsoring 
companies have high leverage (Arnott and Gersovitz, 1980; Cooper and Ross, 2002; 
Cocco and Volpin, 2007); 
iii. Pension funds have lower cover ratios/sponsor contributions when their return on assets 
is relatively low (Cooper and Ross, 2002); 
iv. Pension funds have lower cover ratios/sponsor contributions when the sponsoring firm 
is small (Arnott and Gersovitz, 1980). 
 
Portfolio allocation: 
v. Defined benefit pension funds invest more in shares than defined contribution pension 
funds (Treynor, 1977); 
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vi. Defined benefit pension funds invest more in shares when their sponsoring companies 
have high leverage (Cocco and Volpin, 2007);  
vii. Defined benefit pension funds invest less in shares when their sponsoring companies 
have high leverage (Broeders, 2006). 
 
Note that hypotheses vi and vii are diametrically opposed to each other. 
 
 
4 Methodology and data 
 
 
In view of the above mentioned hypotheses; we estimate models with as dependent variable, 
respectively: 7 
- The pension fund’s cover ratio; 
- The contributions of the sponsor over total contributions; 
- The proportion of shares in the fund’s asset portfolio.  
 
In view of the above hypotheses, we test the following explanatory variables: 
- Sponsoring company’s leverage; 
- Sponsoring company’s profitability;8 
- Pension fund’s return on assets; 
- Defined contribution dummy.  
 
Furthermore, we add a set of control variables to account for all other factors determining 
capital structure and portfolio decisions. First, we add control variables that represent 
characteristics of the funds: 
 
- Fund size. On the one hand, if a large fund is more likely to be rescued by the authorities, 
there may be more temptation for the sponsoring firm to underfund than in the case of a 
smaller fund. On the other hand, smaller firms may be tempted to underfund pension 
liabilities as a way to share risk with workers (Arnott and Gersovitz, 1980; Ippolito, 
1985).  
                                                             
7
 Definitions of the variables are presented in Appendix A. 
8
 Alternative variables could be the sponsoring company’s beta or some other measure of share price volatility. 
However, this would restrict our dataset too much as only half of the sponsoring companies are listed. 
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- Maturity. A less mature fund which has less immediate obligations to pensioners may be 
less afraid of becoming underfunded than a mature fund which has a large proportion of 
pensioners, since risk aversion of the latter will presumably be greater.  
- Reinsurance. The use of reinsurance is a way to decrease insurance risk and may also be 
used as a signalling device to signal financial soundness. 
- Indexation. Indexation obligations demand additional funding efforts. We expect pension 
funds with conditional indexation or no indexation to have lower cover ratios than 
unconditional indexation funds. 
 
Next, we add control variables for the sponsoring firms: 
 
- Sponsoring company’s size. A large size of the sponsoring company increases its ability 
to sponsor the pension fund and may reduce incentives to use underfunding for a 
bargaining counter with workers. 
- Sponsoring company’s size relative to fund size. The probability of underfunding may be 
expected to be greater if the pension fund is relatively large, not least for the impact 
additional contributions will make on the sponsoring company’s profit and loss. 
 
Finally, we add a year dummy for each sample year. This dummy variable captures the effects 
of macro-economic trends or structural breaks, which are common to all funds. To our 
knowledge, there have been no disruptive structural breaks in the supervisory framework 
during the sample period.  
 
The dataset we employ for the pension funds are the individual fund data underlying the 
supervision data published in aggregated form in Tables 8.1 to 8.5 of the quarterly Statistical 
Bulletin of the Dutch central bank (De Nederlandsche Bank, DNB for short). This dataset 
comprises the entire population of Dutch company pension funds. The data for the sponsoring 
companies are taken from Reach.  
 
We leave out 437 fund-year observations with a cover ratio higher than 300%. We drop 31 
funds (111 fund-year observations) with a cover ratio of exactly 100% (these are pure DC 
funds). We drop the fully reinsured funds from the dataset. We ‘winsorize’ the dataset by 
dropping the 1st and 99th percentiles of each variable’s distribution. This leaves us with a 
dataset containing between 5,200 and 7,000 observations for about 500 to 600 pension funds.  
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We selected data for all listed companies sponsoring a company pension fund. For the 
unlisted companies we selected companies with the largest pension funds, leaving out 
financial institutions (because of their incompatible balance sheet characteristics) and 
subsidiaries of foreign multinationals (because the link to Dutch pension funds is presumably 
weak). Hence, this selection procedure implies that the sub-sample including sponsor data is 
biased toward larger pension funds. This selection procedure helps to select those pension 
funds that have a significant impact on the financial position of the sponsoring companies.   
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the samples of company pension funds and sponsoring 
companies.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 gives the means and medians for sub-samples of pension funds, split by pension 
scheme and indexation mechanism for pensioners. As data on scheme and indexation are not 
available for all funds all the time this split-up entails a loss of observations. Most funds have 
defined benefit schemes and conditional indexation for pensioners. Defined benefit funds 
have higher reserves, receive more sponsor contributions, and are larger and more mature than 
defined contribution funds. Defined benefit funds do not invest relatively more in shares, as 
hypothesized on the basis of Treynor (1977).  However, means and medians do not always tell 
the whole story, as they do not take account of the fact investment in shares may differ 
between two groups of funds just because of one or a few other variables influencing portfolio 
allocation. Therefore, the issue is taken up again in the multivariate analysis in the next 
section. The correlations indicate that funds with unconditional indexation have higher cover 
ratios, higher sponsor contributions, and higher reserves, are smaller in size, are more mature 
and invest less in shares than funds with conditional or no indexation.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 3 gives the correlation matrix for our set of variables. It appears that larger funds invest 
more in shares. Funds using reinsurance have higher cover ratios. The correlations between 
variables of funds and their sponsors reveal no significant correlation between a sponsor’s 
leverage and the fund’s investment in shares. The correlation between the sponsor’s leverage 
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and the fund’s cover ratio is slightly negative. For the sponsor’s profitability the correlation is 
positive. As correlations do not take into account the possibility that two variables may 
correlate just because they are both related to a third variable, we will perform a multivariate 
analyses in the next section.     
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
 
5 Results for capital structure 
 
5.1 The cover ratio 
 
We estimate a model relating the pension funds’ cover ratios by a set of explanatory and 
control variables introduced in the previous section. We use GLS which unlike OLS allows 
for the presence of autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional correlation and 
heteroskedasticity across panels. As capital structures are typically autocorrelated and 
heteroskedasticity is a common feature in panels, GLS is especially suitable to our purposes 
(e.g., Greene, 2003). 
 
The first column of Table 4 shows the regression results before including the sponsoring 
variables. Except the conditional indexation dummy and an occasional year dummy, all 
variables are significant. Funds with more mature liabilities (i.e. with payments obligations 
closer in time) and more equity investments (i.e. with higher asset risk) hold more reserves, 
while funds without any indexation obligation (i.e. with lower inflation risk) hold lower 
reserves. Return on assets correlates positively with the cover ratio, which is in support of 
hypothesis iii that pension funds have lower cover ratios when their return on assets is 
relatively low. Funds that use more reinsurance have higher cover ratios, which may link to 
stipulations by reinsurers about levels of risk that are acceptable.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
For easier interpretation of the economic significance of the explanatory variables, Figure 5 
shows their contributions to the explanation of the cover ratio. Each bar represents the partial 
effect of one-standard deviation increase in a particular explanatory variable on the mean 
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predicted cover ratio. Maturity appears to be the most important determinant, followed by the 
proportion of shares in the asset portfolio.  
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
The second column of Table 4 presents the results when adding explanatory variables for the 
sponsoring company. As we collected data for about 100 sponsoring companies, the number 
of observations falls to one-fifth. Yet, the overall pattern of the regression still holds; most 
coefficients are robust. Only reinsurance and fund size lose their significance. As for the 
sponsoring company variables, the results suggest that a high leverage of the sponsoring 
company has a negative effect on the fund’s cover ratio. This result supports hypothesis ii. A 
large size for the sponsoring company in absolute terms affects the cover ratio positively, 
consistent with hypothesis iv that small firms are more likely to use pension underfunding to 
influence wage bargaining. The profitability of the sponsoring company in a particular year 
does not have a significant contemporaneous effect on the fund’s cover ratio, contrary to 
hypothesis i.  
 
5.2 The probability of underfunding 
 
In this subsection, we address the probability of underfunding. The dependent variable in the 
probit model is a dummy variable ‘underfunding’ with the following values: 
 
underfunding = 0 if cover ratio > 130% 
underfunding = 1 if cover ratio ≤  130% 
 
The choice for the 130% hurdle ratio was already discussed in Section 2.3. The frequency 
distribution of underfunding is given by year in Table 5. The year 2002 stands out as a crisis 
year with the most cases of underfunding, both in absolute and relative terms. 9 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
                                                             
9
 The main results of the probit analysis proved to be not very sensitive to the choice of the hurdle rate. Lower 
hurdle rates gave less significant outcomes though, due to the fact that there remain too few observations in the 
underfunding group, which diminishes the discriminatory power of this type of model. 
 14 
The probit approach is taken from the literature on corporate bankruptcy, being employed by 
e.g. Bunn and Redwood (2003). The probit model is to be preferred to the traditional 
discriminant analysis according to comparative work by e.g. Lennox (1999), who shows that 
the former can identify failing companies more accurately than the latter. We note that other 
work on company failures has recently employed the Merton (1974) model, which imposes 
assumptions about the value of firms’ underlying assets and capital structure. Whether the 
firm defaults is determined by the market value of its assets in conjunction with the liability 
structure. However, the Merton model requires a share price to assess volatility and 
information on default probabilities. This information generally is not available for our 
sample of pension funds.  
 
The results from the probit are shown in the first two columns of Table 6. The first column 
gives the results with the complete set of potentially explanatory fund variables introduced in 
the previous section. We have added the lagged reserves ratio. The reason is that we expect 
the probability of underfunding to be lower the higher the reserves are the year before. Indeed, 
the marginal effect for this variable is significant and negative. The second column gives the 
results omitting the insignificant variables. As expected, funds with sizable reserves and funds 
using reinsurance are less likely to run into a state of underfunding. This is also true of funds 
with high returns, which is consistent with hypothesis iii that relatively low returns give an 
incentive to underfund. Mature funds are less likely to be underfunded than immature funds. 
The coefficients of the year dummies are significant and indicate that macroeconomic 
developments increased the risk of underfunding for all funds, especially in the stock market 
crash years 2000-2002.  
 
The fourth column gives the results when adding sponsoring company variables, if 
significant. As we collected data for 100 sponsoring companies, the number of observations 
falls by 75%. Yet, the fit of the regression still holds and the coefficients of reserves and 
reinsurance are robust. Maturity and return on assets lose their significance, which is due to 
the loss of observations; see the third column where model 2 is re-estimated using the sub-
sample of model 4. As for the sponsoring company variables, the results in model 4 suggest 
that the relative size of the sponsoring company is an important determinant of the risk of 
underfunding of the pension fund. A large size for the sponsoring company relative to the 
pension fund’s size, reduces the underfunding risk of the company pension fund. This is 
consistent with hypothesis iv that it is the small risk-averse firms that may seek underfunded 
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pension liabilities as a way to share risk with risk-averse workers. Large firms may seek to 
avoid underfunding due to reputation risk and to avoid repercussions on their credit rating. 
 
[insert Table 6 about here] 
 
 
6 Results for sponsor contributions 
 
To the sponsoring company, the most direct way to influence the pension fund’s cover ratio is 
to lower its contributions to the fund. In this section we test the hypotheses formulated for 
capital structure in terms of the sponsor’s contributions. The dependent variable is the 
contributions from the sponsor over total contributions received by the pension fund. The set 
of explanatory variables is the same as before, though the lagged cover ratio has been added. 
 
The first column of Table 7 presents the results without including the variables from the 
sponsor dataset. The cover ratio has a negative coefficient, which suggests that sponsors 
contribute more when their pension funds are lower on funding. This would be consistent with 
the exercise of guarantee options described by Kocken (2006). We further find that sponsor 
contributions are generally lower for larger pension funds. Maturity, equity investment, nor 
fund profitability are found to be significant for the level of sponsor contributions. Sponsor 
contributions are higher for funds using reinsurance, maybe because of stipulations of 
reinsurers. We do not find a significant coefficient for the defined contribution dummy. The 
year dummies reveal that sponsor contributions increased for most funds to a higher level 
since 2001, the episode where many pension funds had difficulties.    
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
The second column of Table 7 presents the results including the sponsor variables. Again, the 
sample shrinks to one-fifth due to the limited number of sponsoring companies in our dataset. 
Most coefficients are robust to this and keep their significance and sign. Only the two 
indexation dummy variables take over significance, and the year dummies loose significance 
except for the year 2002, which happens to be the hardest year for pension funds and sponsor 
contributions must have been very welcome. As for the sponsor variables, sponsor 
profitability is found to have a negative coefficient, which is inconsistent with hypothesis i 
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and contradicts our earlier finding for the cover ratio. The size of the sponsoring company has 
a positive effect on contributions, which supports hypothesis iv that small sponsoring firms 
are more likely to use pension underfunding to influence wage bargaining. This result 
confirms our earlier result for the cover ratio and underfunding. 
   
 
7 Results for portfolio allocation 
 
In this section we test the hypotheses formulated for the effect of the sponsor on the funds’ 
portfolio allocation. The dependent variable is the proportion of shares in the pension fund’s 
investment portfolio. The set of explanatory variables is the same as before.  
 
Again, the first column of Table 8 presents the results before adding the sponsor variables. 
The defined contribution dummy has a negative coefficient, which implies that defined 
benefit funds invest more in shares than their defined contribution counterparts. This is 
consistent with hypothesis v. As for the control variables, we find a significantly positive 
relationship between a fund’s cover ratio and its investment in shares. Further, we find that 
larger sized funds and less mature funds invest more in shares. This is to be expected, as large 
funds can better diversify risk in their portfolio and less mature funds have longer investment 
horizons. The results further suggest that more profitable funds and funds that use more 
reinsurance invest less in shares.  
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
The second column of Table 8 presents the results when including the sponsor variables. 
Again, despite the shrinkage of the sample size most coefficients keep their significance and 
sign. Only maturity and reinsurance lose their significance and the coefficient of the defined 
contribution dummy switches its sign from negative to positive. This means that hypothesis v 
no longer holds for the smaller sample. It should be kept in mind, however, that the small 
proportion of defined contribution funds in our sample (about 7%) may be the cause of this 
instability. As for the sponsor variables, we find a significantly positive effect of leverage, 
which is consistent with hypothesis vi and thus inconsistent with vii. We further find a 
positive effect of the relative size of the sponsor.      
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[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
 
8 Conclusion 
 
This study presents empirical evidence on the influence of sponsoring companies on the 
funding and portfolio allocation decisions of their defined benefit pension funds. Several 
hypotheses taken from the theoretical literature are tested using a microdataset of around 550 
Dutch company pension funds over the ten year period 1996-2005, combined with a 
microdataset on 100 of their sponsoring firms. The wide variation in funding levels over this 
period provides a natural experiment in the determinants of underfunding and portfolio 
composition. 
 
Our empirical tests address the influence of sponsoring firms on pension funds’ cover ratios, 
underfunding risks, as well as their decisions concerning the proportion of their investment 
portfolios that is allocated to shares. Moreover, we directly investigate the determinants of 
sponsor contributions to the pension fund. This is the first paper to address these theoretical 
issues in a comprehensive manner. Table 8 summarizes the evidence found for the seven 
hypotheses formulated in Section 3.  
 
Summarizing unambiguous and significant evidence only, we find empirical support for the 
following hypotheses: 
- Pension funds have lower cover ratios when their sponsoring companies have high 
leverage. This is consistent with the predictions of Arnott and Gersovitz (1980), Cooper 
and Ross (2002) and Cocco and Volpin (2007).  
- Pension funds have lower cover ratios when their return on assets is relatively low. This 
supports Cooper and Ross (2002). 
- Pension funds have lower cover ratios and receive lower sponsor contributions when their 
sponsoring firm is small. This is consistent with the predictions of Arnott and Gersovitz 
(1980). 
- Defined benefit pension funds invest more in shares when their sponsoring companies 
have high leverage. This confirms Cocco and Volpin (2007) and contradicts the prediction 
of Broeders (2006). 
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These results provide strong empirical support for there being a consistent influence of 
sponsors’ corporate financial structures on pension funding, largely in the direction of greater 
risk in the pension fund when there is more risk in the corporate balance sheet. The results 
may justify closer focus by pension regulators on the financial state of the sponsoring firm 
than has been the case hitherto. It is notable that such links apply consistently in the 
Netherlands despite the absence of pension benefit insurance that gives rise to moral hazard 
on the part of the sponsor vis-à-vis the insurer. Such patterns are likely to be even more 
marked when such insurance is present, as historically in the US and now in the UK also. 
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Appendix A – Variable definitions  
 
Conditional indexation dummy = 1 if conditional indexation; = 0 if unconditional 
indexation or no indexation 
Contributions received from the 
sponsor 
Sponsoring company’s contributions over total 
contributions 
Cover ratio Assets / Required technical provision 
Defined contribution  
dummy 
= 1 if defined contribution; = 0 if defined benefit 
Fund size Logarithm of number of fund participants 
Investment yield Yield on investment / Value of investments at the 
beginning of the year 
Maturity Inactive fund participants / Active fund participants 
No indexation 
dummy 
= 1 if no indexation; = 0 if indexation 
Reinsurance Reinsured / Technical provision 
Fund reserves Reserves / Total liabilities 
Fund return on assets Result / Total assets 
Sponsoring company’s size Log(number of employees sponsoring company) 
Sponsoring company’s size / 
pension fund’s size 
Sponsoring company’s balance sheet total / Pension 
fund’s balance sheet total 
Sponsoring company’s leverage Sponsoring company’s debt to total assets ratio 
Sponsoring company’s 
profitability 
Sponsoring company’s return on total assets 
Shares Shares / Total investments 
Underfunding Dummy variable = 1 if cover ratio ≤  130%; = 0 if cover 
ratio > 130% 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 - Summary statistics 1996-2005 
 Mean 
(unweighted) 
Median Standard 
deviation 
Number of 
observations 
Pension Funds:     
Cover ratio 1.308 1.237 0.286 5211 
Reserves 0.209 0.154 0.214 6731 
Fund size 6.020 6.144 1.684 6119 
Maturity 0.341 0.286 0.264 6242 
Shares 0.227 0.230 0.191 7008 
Return on assets 0.008 0.004 0.064 6986 
Reinsurance 0.057 0.000 0.185 5583 
Contributions from 
sponsor 
0.801 0.844 0.269 6338 
Sponsoring firms:     
Leverage 0.657 0.672 0.165 1053 
Profitability 0.076 0.070 0.093 1052 
Company size 8.322 8.211 1.617 1023 
Relative size 11.244 3.003 27.222 1053 
Explanatory note: Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. 
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Table 2 – Summary statistics by pension scheme and indexation mechanism, 1996-2005 
Pension scheme Indexation mechanism for pensioners  
Defined 
benefit 
Defined 
contribution 
Unconditional Conditional No indexation 
Cover ratio 1.282 
1.215** 
.
a)
 
.
a)
 
1.431** 
1.307 
1.279 
1.216 
1.269 
1.176 
Reserves 0.191** 
0.143** 
.
a)
 
.
a)
 
0.249** 
0.165** 
0.179 
0.143 
0.215 
0.092 
Fund size 6.154** 
6.275** 
5.593 
5.983 
5.846** 
6.157** 
6.254 
6.380 
5.196 
5.278 
Maturity 0.348** 
0.298** 
0.277 
0.145 
0.424** 
0.370** 
0.336 
0.284 
0.425 
0.359 
Shares 0.253 
0.263 
0.243 
0.247 
0.186** 
0.155** 
0.267 
0.279 
0.175 
0.084 
Return on 
assets 
0.003 
0.004** 
0.006 
0.000 
0.011 
0.009** 
0.003 
0.009 
0.003 
0.002 
Reinsurance 0.048 
0.000* 
0.029 
0.000 
0.035** 
0.000* 
0.045 
0.000 
0.092 
0.000 
Contributions 
from sponsor 
0.815** 
0.853** 
0.678 
0.676 
0.855** 
1.000** 
0.813 
0.851 
0.763 
0.808 
Number of 
observations 
3,860 195 125 3,582 313 
Explanatory note: The first and second rows in each cell give the mean and median, respectively. Statistical 
significance of differences between categories at 5% or 1% significance levels are indicated by * and **, 
respectively. Significance tests are based on t-tests or analysis of variance for differences in means by pension 
scheme and indexation mechanism, respectively, and on Pearson chi-square tests for differences in medians. 
Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. 
a) Not applicable. 
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Table 3 – Correlation coefficients, 1996-2005 
 Cover ratio Reserves Fund size Maturity Shares Return 
on assets 
Between  funds: 
      
Cover ratio 1.000      
Reserves 0.792 1.000     
Fund size 
-0.106 -0.034 1.000    
Maturity 0.165 0.193 -0.083 1.000   
Shares 0.125 0.229 0.314 -0.079 1.000  
Fund’s return on assets 0.169 0.224 0.008 -0.039 0.006 1.000 
Reinsurance 0.390 -0.042 -0.104 0.039 -0.079 -0.014 
Contributions by sponsor 
-0.072 -0.090 -0.126 -0.063 -0.072 0.021 
Between funds and sponsors: 
      
Sponsor’s leverage 
-0.079 -0.086 0.090 -0.159 0.026 -0.053 
Sponsor’s profitability 0.147 0.181 -0.065 0.004 0.039 0.097 
Sponsor’s size 0.077 0.110 0.408 -0.046 0.179 0.026 
Sponsor over fund size 
-0.075 -0.139 -0.469 -0.206 -0.100 0.014 
     
  
 Sponsor’s 
leverage 
Sponsor’s 
profit- 
ability 
Sponsor’s 
size 
Sponsor 
over fund 
size 
  
Between sponsors: 
      
Sponsor’s leverage 1.000      
Sponsor’s profitability 
-0.119 1.000     
Sponsor’s size 0.184 -0.068 1.000    
Sponsor over fund size 0.053 -0.015 0.113 1.000   
Explanatory note: Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. 
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Table 4 –GLS Regression results, 1996-2005 
Dependent variable is the cover ratio 
 Without sponsoring 
company variables (1) 
With sponsoring 
company variables 
(2) 
Fund size(t-1) -0.003* 0.005 
Maturity(t-1) 0.181** 0.144** 
Shares(t-1) 0.179** 0.291** 
Return on assets(t-1) 0.236** 0.200** 
Reinsurance(t-1) 0.098** -0.007 
Conditional indexation -0.049 -0.023 
No indexation -0.099** -0.092* 
Sponsoring company’s leverage  -0.051* 
Sponsoring company’s profitability  0.046 
Sponsoring company’s size  0.016** 
Sponsoring company’s size / pension fund’s size  -0.000 
Year 1999 -0.006 0.044** 
Year 2000 -0.096** -0.085** 
Year 2001 -0.201** -0.215** 
Year 2002 -0.320** -0.373** 
Year 2003 -0.279** -0.308** 
Year 2004 -0.270** -0.303** 
Year 2005 -0.232** -0.251** 
Intercept 1.403** 1.220** 
   
Pseudo R2 0.310 0.478 
Number of observations 3207 640 
Number of funds 544 106 
Explanatory note: The feasible generalized least squares estimator has been used, which allows for the presence of 
AR(1) autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity across panels. Suffixes * 
and ** indicate statistical significance at 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are given in Appendix 
A. 
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Table 5 – Frequency distribution of underfunding by year 
 Underfunding = 0 Underfunding = 1 Total 
 Observations Percent Observations Percent Observations 
1996 265 55.7 211 44.3 476 
1997 305 65.2 163 34.8 468 
1998 334 66.0 172 34.0 506 
1999 332 65.4 176 34.6 508 
2000 307 52.7 275 47.3 582 
2001 181 31.8 388 68.2 569 
2002 67 12.3 478 87.7 545 
2003 68 12.5 477 87.5 545 
2004 89 17.1 432 82.9 521 
2005 130 26.4 362 73.6 492 
Total 2078 39.9 3134 60.1 5212 
Explanatory note: Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. 
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Table 6 – Probit estimates, 1996-2005 
Dependent variable is underfunding 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Marginal effects 
Reserves(t-1) -4.398** -4.575** -7.212** -7.138** 
Fund size(t-1) 0.003    
Maturity(t-1) -0.166** -0.158* -0.139 -0.250 
Shares(t-1) -0.003    
Return on assets(t-1) -0.643* -0.696* -0.237 -0.169 
Reinsurance(t-1) -1.351** -1.433** -1.163* -1.144* 
Sponsor size over fund size    -0.003* 
 Fixed effects 
Conditional indexation 0.142    
No indexation 0.047    
Dummy 1999 0.139** 0.147** 0.002  
Dummy 2000 0.239** 0.263** 0.325** 0.288** 
Dummy 2001 0.345** 0.372** 0.442** 0.425** 
Dummy 2002 0.382** 0.412** 0.509** 0.497** 
Dummy 2003 0.208** 0.234**   
Dummy 2004 0.205** 0.219**   
Dummy 2005 0.156** 0.175**   
     
Pseudo R2 0.533 0.528 0.648 0.662 
Number of obs. 3199 3724 764 764 
Number of funds 618 670 123 123 
Explanatory note: The reported marginal effects are changes in the probability that underfunding = 1 
for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable. The reported fixed effects are 
changes in the probability that underfunding = 1 for a discrete change in each independent dummy 
variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors (not reported) are calculated using the Huber/White/sandwich 
estimator and allowing for correlation of observations for the same company. Suffixes * and ** 
indicate statistical significance of the effects at 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are 
given in Appendix A. 
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Table 7 –GLS Regression results, 1996-2005 
Dependent variable is sponsor’s contributions over total contributions 
  (1)  (2) 
Cover ratio(t-1) -0.050** -0.119** 
Fund size(t-1) -0.026** -0.032** 
Maturity(t-1) -0.011 0.023 
Shares(t-1) 0.012 0.072 
Return on assets(t-1) 0.006 0.092 
Reinsurance(t-1) 0.173** 0.362* 
Defined contribution 0.020 -0.036 
Conditional indexation 0.037 0.089* 
No indexation 0.054* 0.093 
Sponsoring company’s leverage  -0.004 
Sponsoring company’s profitability  -0.135* 
Sponsoring company’s size  0.012* 
Sponsor size over fund size  -0.000 
Year 1999 0.007* 0.015 
Year 2000 0.007 -0.012 
Year 2001 0.023** 0.015 
Year 2002 0.031** 0.040* 
Year 2003 0.030** 0.037 
Year 2004 0.028** 0.027 
Year 2005 0.033** 0.018 
Intercept 1.017 0.963 
   
Pseudo R2 0.062 0.072 
Number of observations 3078 632 
Number of funds 527 106 
Explanatory note: The feasible generalized least squares estimator has been used, which allows for the presence of 
AR(1) autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity across panels. Suffixes * 
and ** indicate statistical significance at 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are given in Appendix 
A. 
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Table 8 –GLS Regression results, 1996-2005 
Dependent variable is the proportion of shares in the pension fund’s investment portfolio  
  (1)  (2) 
Cover ratio(t-1) 0.103** 0.235** 
Fund size(t-1) 0.025** 0.038** 
Maturity(t-1) -0.020* 0.012 
Return on assets(t-1) -0.067** -0.227** 
Reinsurance(t-1) -0.226** 0.041 
Defined contribution -0.034** 0.116** 
Conditional indexation 0.026 0.021 
No indexation 0.000 0.032 
Sponsoring company’s leverage  0.049** 
Sponsoring company’s profitability  0.004 
Sponsoring company’s size  -0.004 
Sponsor size over fund size  0.001** 
Year 1999 0.047** 0.055** 
Year 2000 0.027** 0.028** 
Year 2001 0.034** 0.048** 
Year 2002 -0.007 0.000 
Year 2003 0.032** 0.054** 
Year 2004 0.036** 0.070** 
Year 2005 0.044** 0.081** 
Intercept -0.048* -0.312** 
   
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.280 
Number of observations 3216 637 
Number of funds 551 106 
Explanatory note: The feasible generalized least squares estimator has been used, which allows for the presence of 
AR(1) autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity across panels. Suffixes * 
and ** indicate statistical significance at 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are given in Appendix 
A. 
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Table 9 – Summary of evidence on hypotheses 
 Capital structure 
 Cover ratio Underfunding 
Sponsor 
contributions 
Portfolio 
allocation 
Hi – 0 +  
Hii + 0 0  
Hiii + + 0  
Hiv + + +  
Hv    ±  
Hvi    + 
Hvii    – 
Explanatory note: + or – indicates evidence in support or against a hypothesis.  0 indicates no significant result. 
Blank indicates that the hypothesis was not tested. H# refers to the hypotheses and their numbers mentioned in 
Section 3. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Importance of pension funds in OECD countries, 2005 (%gdp)
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Figure 2 - Solvency and profitability 
(Median company pension fund)
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Figure 3 - Percentile distribution of cover ratio
(Observations with cover ratio > 3 have been removed) 
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Figure 4 - Frequency distribution of change in cover ratio 
between 1999 and 2002  
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Figure 5 - Contribution of selected explanatory variables 
(Partial effect of one-standard-deviation increase in explanatory variable
 on mean predicted cover ratio)
-0,01
0
0,01
0,02
0,03
0,04
0,05
Size Maturity Shares Return on assets Reinsurance
 
 
 
 
 
 
